Manage Bitrix24 CRM leads, contacts and deals via a portal's own inbound webhook.
Bitrix24 ships in the w6w first-party pack. It declares 15 actions, 2 health checks, and the host runs its code in a sandbox that never sees the credential.
io.w6w.bitrix24Bitrix24 is a CRM and collaboration suite, sold both as shared SaaS and as fully self-hosted on-premise software — every customer’s install is its own ‘portal’ with its own address and database. This app covers the core CRM loop against that portal’s own REST API: create, read, search, update and delete leads, contacts and deals, authenticated with a portal-generated inbound webhook rather than a full OAuth2 app registration.
Leads, contacts and deals each get the same five operations, using Bitrix24’s classic per-entity methods (crm.lead., crm.contact., crm.deal.) rather than the newer universal crm.item. family the vendor now steers new integrations toward — the classic methods remain fully documented and give each entity its own typed, curated field set rather than one generic shape keyed by entityTypeId. An ‘Additional Fields’ escape hatch on every write action reaches any field not curated explicitly, including a portal’s own custom UF_CRM_* fields.
Left out on purpose: OAuth2 (the webhook reaches the same surface with one generated URL and no per-portal app registration), and everything outside leads/contacts/deals — companies, products, activities, timeline and the rest of Bitrix24’s REST surface.
Three routes to the same 15 actions. The Workflow tab is generated from Bitrix24's own manifest and carries its real ids, so it is copy-pasteable; the Code and CLI examples are the same call for any action on any app, so every app-specific value in them is a blank you fill in.
A workflow step names the app and the action, and the editor fills in the
connection when you pick one. This is the Step shape from the
workflow spec, carrying Bitrix24's real ids.
{
"manifestVersion": "2",
"name": "bitrix24-example",
"steps": [
{
"id": "contact-get",
"uses": {
"app": "io.w6w.bitrix24",
"action": "contact-get",
"connection": "conn_YOUR_CONNECTION_ID"
},
"with": {
"id": "<id>"
}
}
]
}contact-get contact-add contact-list contact-update deal-add +10 more actions available
Every app-specific value here is a blank you have to fill in. An
app action is reached through the connection that authenticates it, so the
address is a connection id, not the app id — and connections belong to your account,
so a public page cannot know yours. Create one for Bitrix24, then fill in
the three blanks: conn_YOUR_CONNECTION_ID, the action key, and the
parameters that action declares. The call itself is real — the shape is transcribed
from the studio's own snippet builder, which prints the same kind of blanks — but
nothing in it is specific to Bitrix24. The Workflow tab is where this app's
real ids are.
npm install @w6w/sdkyarn add @w6w/sdkpnpm add @w6w/sdkdeno add npm:@w6w/sdkimport { W6wClient, isActionRun } from "@w6w/sdk";
// Reads W6W_BASE_URL and W6W_TOKEN from the environment when omitted.
const client = new W6wClient();
const envelope = await client.run({
urn: "conn_YOUR_CONNECTION_ID",
action: "contact-get",
payload: {
id: "<value>",
},
});
if (isActionRun(envelope)) console.log(envelope.value); npm install -g @w6w/cli w6w run conn_YOUR_CONNECTION_ID --action contact-get --payload '{"id":"<value>"}' Give an AI agent Bitrix24 — without giving it Bitrix24's credentials. One MCP endpoint exposes every app, function and workflow the caller is entitled to, as tools it can discover and run. Access is granted per team while we onboard.
One tool call{
"name": "w6w_invoke",
"arguments": {
"ref": "app:io.w6w.bitrix24#contact-get",
"input": {
"id": "<id>"
}
}
}
Every tool names its target with a single ref. The
app: form above doesn't name a connection at all — the
host resolves which of the caller's Bitrix24 connections to sign
with, and refuses rather than guesses when the answer is ambiguous.
The token is attached host-side, at the moment of the call. It is never a tool argument, never in the model's context, and never in a transcript — so a prompt injection has nothing to exfiltrate.
Tools are derived per end user from what that person has actually connected and is entitled to — not one shared bot identity carrying the union of everyone's access.
Multi-step work runs on the workflow engine and returns a run handle the agent can poll — retries, branching and state survive the conversation that started them.
Bitrix24's declared health checks are on the surface too, so an agent can tell "the vendor is down" from "your credential expired" before it burns a retry on either.
The MCP surface is part of the hosted platform. Bitrix24 itself is MIT, and the runtime that executes it is source-available (FSL).
Bitrix24 declares its own checks, so its health is a property of the app rather than something the host guesses at.
This connection's own portal, via an unsigned request Bitrix24 must still route to answer — an expired or revoked webhook must not make a healthy portal look down.